The U.S. has a long history of drug abuse. Legally, the United States imported opium for more than a hundred years. Morphine was in common use during the Civil War. Heroin was manufactured by the end of the nineteenth century. And cocaine, long a popular tonic, was marketed as a cure for narcotic addiction.

By the beginning of this century there was a steadily strengthening sentiment for outlawing alcohol but little public concern for the widespread use of narcotics. They were plentiful and cheap. Drugstores sold them without a prescription. Grocery stores stocked them. Mail order houses distributed them across the countryside, for the most part concealed in any number of patent medicines from consumption cures to teething syrups for children. Though the symptoms of narcotic addiction were known, they were not recognized in Main Street America, except as signs of rare moral degeneracy in minority groups or immigrants, essentially a vice or sickness of outsiders.

What pressures there were to control the flourishing international commerce in narcotics came originally from outside the U.S. The federal government first recognized the drug problem when it took over the governing of the Philippine Islands after the Spanish-American War. At the instigation of the Right Reverend Charles H. Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, President Theodore Roosevelt called for an international conference to take steps to control the opium traffic, particularly in the Far East. A conference was held in Shanghai in 1909, and another one at The Hague in 1911, out of which came the first international opium agreement. The U.S. then found itself in the awkward position of restricting the use of opium overseas while doing nothing to control it at home. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, a staunch prohibitionist, urged the passage of a law that would fulfill our obligations under the new international treaty.

The Harrison Narcotic Act, establishing the foundations of federal drug law enforcement, was signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson on Dec. 17, 1914. There was little political reaction for it or against it, because nobody knew what it meant; it was broadly believed that any federal regulation of the medical profession would be unconstitutional—an infringement on states rights. For this reason the new law, at least on the face of it, was no more than a revenue measure, providing for the registration and taxation of those who manufactured or distributed opium, morphine, heroin, or coca products, which have since been included within the legal definition of narcotics. The act made no mention of addicts, and the only violations specified were for failure to register or keep honest records. Section 8, however, said it would be unlawful for anyone who was not registered to have any of these drugs in his possession. Moreover, there was an ambiguous phrase that said a physician could prescribe narcotics in good faith and “in the course of his professional practice only,” which implied, without specifying, a constraint on the otherwise unquestioned authority of the medical profession to dispense addictive drugs.

Since the Harrison Act was a tax law, responsibility for enforcing it was left to the Treasury Department. Under an assistant secretary in charge of collections and revenues was lodged the predecessor agency of the Bureau of Customs, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. While customs officials and the Coast Guard kept control of border smuggling, the Bureau of Internal Revenue undertook enforcement of the Harrison Act. Within its ranks was something called, for lack of a more precise...
name, the Miscellaneous Division, whose regulatory responsibilities were to include control over oleomargarine, adulterated butter, filled cheese, mixed flour, cotton futures, playing cars, and last but not least, narcotics. It was in these humble surroundings that the first federal narcotics agent was born on the day the Harrison Act became law, March 1, 1915.

In all there were 162 of them. They were allowed to design their own badges; some badges were fashioned after the military, others reflect the spirit of the Wild West. But the authority they symbolized would remain for some time in the realm of the imagination. No sooner did the law enter into force than the agents began to arrest physicians and druggists who were indiscriminately supplying narcotic addicts in violation of the intent of the law. In May, however, a district judge declared that an addict could not be held to possess narcotics illegally since he was not allowed to register under the act. Soon another district judge in Florida declared that there was nothing in the law to limit the quantity of narcotics that a physician might prescribe. Flashing their badges, the agents seized 44 pounds of opium before the year was over; in federal courts they managed to get 100 convictions, versus 25 acquittals. Ten years in prison was the maximum sentence.

In 1916 the critical question of who could control the use of drugs in a free society went all the way up to the Supreme Court. Dr. Jin Fuey Moy of Pittsburgh had prescribed a sixteenth of an ounce of morphine sulphate for an addict, one Willie Martin. The case was dismissed in district court on the grounds that any regulation of medicine was a power reserved to the states. The Government appealed, making as much as it could of the argument that the law was intended to fulfill international treaty obligations. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the majority opinion, rejected the argument, noting that the act had nothing at all to say about international obligations. By a vote of seven to two, the Court overruled the Government's claim to implicit police powers. That year the Bureau had 663 convictions and 183 acquittals. Although a large number of addicts, convicted under Section 8, were promptly released from prison, the Treasury Department kept their fines.

In the following year, the U.S. went to war. Opium coming into the country was so severely curtailed that the Bureau of Internal Revenue had to ask Congress to conserve opium supplies. Total seizures for the year were 5.5 pounds of opium, and the year after that, if there was more than a single morphine seizure, the Bureau failed to record it in its annual report to the Congress. Meanwhile, the Bureau was reorganizing what it called its field forces into two classes: collectors and deputy collectors, who assessed as well as collected the taxes, on one side; and agents and inspectors, whose duties were primarily investigative on the other. Since there were few funds allotted to narcotics enforcement, the Bureau changed the title of narcotics agents to plain agent or inspector in an effort to get them more money. Salaries started at $1,500, and per diem was $3.00 a day. Collectors and deputy collectors also got a bounty on how much they collected in taxes. To get a top salary of $4,000 they had to collect a million dollars a year. Then, and for many years thereafter, agents worked alone and without official advanced funds. One poor agent wrote the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue from Dallas: “Court just closed here. I got 13 convictions, one for moonshining and the balance for narcotic violations.” He added, “I expect to leave here this week for Fort Worth, which has the reputation of being a real dope town. My only experience there so far was the loss of 15 good dollars two months ago buying an eighth ounce of morphine. I got the morphine and the man all right but not the 15, and unfortunately the Revenue Agent here did not have the funds to reimburse me.” Another agent reported that he was negotiating for a purchase of 20 cans of opium at $45.00 a can with a seller he identified as the Mayor of Chinatown in the nation’s capital, using a “flash roll” provided from Treasury funds. The bust went down in spite of the fact that he had to rush back and return the funds before the Treasury closed its vault at 5:00 p.m. It then developed that the opium, wrapped in California newspapers, had come from an old Customs seizure off the West Coast. It was not the integrity of the Government the agent questioned but its security procedures when he reported: “In the Purveying Depot of the Public Health Service, located on the first floor of this building, there is stored a large stock of opium and narcotics turned over to that service by the Internal Revenue Bureau, which has no more protection than a wire grill or screenwork in the windows, and if the peddlers and addicts knew of its existence and accessibility they would break into the building and cart it all away within 48 hours.” WW I focused attention on what was then called the “soldier’s disease” of narcotic addiction. The Bureau hired a chemist to research a product made popular by the makers of aspirin. The product was heroin. "Morphine and heroin," the chemist observed reassuringly, “could be put on the market only in the form of a hard, gritty or granular powder which would be physically impossible for anyone to sniff. Soldier and sailor alike would not easily become initiated to the injection needle.”
As WW I came to a close, the wave of patriotic fervor that had rolled out to defeat the Kaiser rolled back against our shores. A host of internal enemies, real and imaginary, appeared to threaten the U.S.: Reds, radicals, anarchists, spies and the archenemy, alcohol. The nation was soon beset by internal strife that it would withdraw from the League of Nations. The 18th Amendment, after ratification by the states, would be enforced by the Bureau of Internal Revenue over the anguished objections of Commissioner Daniel C. Roper, who saw no reason why a tax bureau should be asked to control the consumption of liquor or, for that matter, narcotics. The reason, of course, was the same—to pursue what was confidently felt to be a moral end in a way that might otherwise be unconstitutional. But no one knew how to cure addicts or who should control the distribution of narcotic drugs. While the U.S. Public Health Service urged stronger enforcement to halt the narcotics supply, the Revenue Bureau, unhappily in charge of enforcement, proposed the expansion of public health services. Commissioner Roper also asked Congress for an international treaty between the United States, Mexico and Canada to thwart the resumption of the international narcotics traffic.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear another drug case in March 1919. On the surface it was little different from that of the U.S. v. Jin Fuey Moy only three years earlier. It concerned another physician who prescribed morphine to an addict without any intention of a cure, in an abrupt reversal of opinion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Harrison Act, ruling that such a prescription “would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of the subject is required.” While the debate about liquor was still heating up, there was felt to be no more need to discuss narcotics, except, of course, for the old question of whether it was an illness or a vice. In October of that year the Volstead Act was passed over President Wilson’s veto, setting the circumstances under which the 18th Amendment would be enforced. In December the Revenue Bureau, having no other option, established the Prohibition Unit, which would remain a thorn in its side throughout the Roaring Twenties.

The 18th Amendment went into effect on Jan. 16, 1920. Dry Agents, as they were called, were recruited largely from the ranks of disenchanted war veterans through the time-honored system of political patronage. From the beginning they faced a thankless task as they encountered the resentment of state, city, county and town officials. Originally there were 960 dry agents, and there would never be more than 2,300. Only three of them then earned worth from $40,000 to $50,000 a year.

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In the lengthening shadow of Prohibition enforcement, one step down in the table of organization, was lodged the fledgling Narcotic Division, headed by a former pharmacist, Levi G. Nutt. It consisted of 170 narcotic agents, working out of 13 district offices. In contrast to the dry agents, they had been selected from the beginning under civil service regulations. Though consigned to obscurity, they were granted semi-autonomy and for the first time substantial financial support. More than half a million dollars was allotted to drug enforcement in fiscal year 1920—almost twice the budget of the previous year. Although dry agents were to outnumber narcotics agents by a ratio of more than 10 to one, federal prisons would soon hold more violators convicted under the Harrison Act then under the Volstead Act. By the standards of the present, judges and juries were tough on drug violators, reflecting the mood of the day. In 1921 the Narcotic Division obtained 1,583 convictions, compared with only 119 acquittals, and seized 1,417 pounds of opium, 373 pounds of morphine, 32 pounds of heroin and 286 pounds of cocaine.

The only unresolved policy problem was what to do about addicts. Levi Nutt was opposed to the ethics of addiction maintenance, except for the old and incurable, and before the year 1921 was out managed to close 44 narcotics clinics. The American Medical Association endorsed the closing of the clinics, saying they only served to perpetuate the problem, but it made the first of many recommendations that the regulatory control of narcotics be removed from the increasingly violent operations of liquor law Enforcement to halt the narcotics supply, the Revenue Bureau, unhappily in charge of enforcement, proposed the expansion of public

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enforcement. Theoretically separated, the two were often inextricably intertwined. The Prohibition Unit lost its first agent that year in a whiskey raid at El Paso, TX. Prohibition Agent Charles Wood and his boss, Chief Prohibition Agent Stafford E. Beckett, were executing a federal search warrant at a ranch house when shots rang out, and a two-hour gun battle ensued. Wood was fatally shot in the back as he tried to crawl away. The murderers were captured and later tried in a state court since the killing of a prohibition agent was not then against federal law. But El Paso was a wet town, and everyone was acquitted. Before the year was over seven other narcotics agents were dead.

The following year, Prohibition Agent Joseph W. Floyd and three other agents raided a residence in downtown Houston, armed with a search warrant for narcotics and whiskey. He was standing on the running board of a car as it swung into the front yard when the fatal shot was fired, and he died an hour later. After an exchange of gunfire, the occupants gave up, and five persons were arrested, but only one went to trial for violation of the Harrison Act, and he got a year and a day. There were no charges filed for Floyd's murder. Twelve agents were killed that year, and 28 others were wounded. Speaking of the Volstead Act, President Warrant G. Harding told Congress, “There are conditions relating to enforcement which savor of nationwide scandal. It is the most demoralizing factor in public life.”

The Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was passed by Congress on May 26, 1922. Known also as the Jones-Miller Act, it was the first step in monitoring international commerce in opiates. The act created the Federal Narcotics Control Board, composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce, to prohibit opium imports for other than medical purposes, to limit exports to nations with an adequate licensing system, and as amended two years later to outlaw the manufacture of heroin in the U.S. Congressional leadership in narcotics control was then in the hands of Representative Steven G. Porter, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His single-minded objective prefigures a priority of policy makers of today. Before anything else could be done to enforce the Harrison Act, he insisted, the flow of narcotics must be controlled at the source. It was Porter who led the American delegation to the Second International Opium Convention, which began in Geneva on Nov. 17, 1924.

The first agent's manual came out that year. An applicant, it stated, “must possess good manners and be of good moral character, attested by at least three reputable citizens who have known him for a period of not less than three years.” In those days there were no female agents. There was no sick leave, and agents were expected to work a six-day week for an average salary of $1,800 a year. The manual instructed agents to advise a defendant of his rights. Though they had no powers of arrest without a warrant, they were further cautioned to turn over prisoners to a peace officer, and swear out a warrant as soon as possible. Annual records of the domestic drug war reveal the accidental death of two more federal agents and 22 defendants.

The Second Geneva Convention was signed on Feb. 19, 1925. Though it would not enter into force for another three years, it provided for a number of far-reaching innovations, including the adoption of an international system of licensing, record keeping, and export regulations, statistical reporting, and the supervision of the system as a whole by an independent Permanent Central Board (PCB) within the framework of the League of Nations. Meanwhile, the intransigent Porter had walked out of the conference in his impatience with the opium-producing nations. Still estranged from the League, the U.S. never signed the treaty. At home five more federal prohibition agents were killed; thirty-nine others were wounded; twenty defendants were killed.

In 1926, the starting salary of new recruits was raised to $2,100 annually. If you wanted to enter the profession, according to regulations, you could weigh no more than 185 pounds and must be between 21 and 45 years of age. Moreover, you could not retire until you were 70. Not many lived that long. In April 1926 the Bureau reported a total death toll over the years of 47 prohibition agents and 89 defendants. Congress complained that there was too much killing.

An act of Congress in April 1921 at last relieved the Revenue Bureau of responsibility for liquor law enforcement, creating the Bureau of Prohibition, directly under the Secretary of Treasury. There was an effort to upgrade standards by requiring dry agents to take civil service examinations, which 59 percent of them failed. One dry agent admitted he was unable to read or write. The Bureau's Narcotic Division, however, required recruits to be graduates of an accredited college of medicine or pharmacy with at least a year of professional experience. There were now 289 narcotics agents, operating on a budget of $1.3 million.

“Most of the daylight robberies, daring holdups, cruel murders and similar crimes of violence are now known to be committed chiefly by drug addicts, who constitute the primary cause of our alarming crime wave,” said Richmond P. Hobson, the chief anti-narcotics crusader of the day, in a nationwide radio broadcast on March 1, 1928. “Drug addiction is more communicable and less curable than leprosy. Drug addicts are the principal carriers of vice diseases, and with their lowered resistance are incubators and carriers of the streptococcus, pneumococcus, the germ of flu, of tuberculosis and other diseases.” He closed by saying, “Upon this issue hangs the perpetuation of civilization, the destiny of the world, and the future of the human race.” That month Congress passed an important act, authorizing for the first time advance funds for narcotics enforcement, better known as buy money. The first training school was established, offering a six-week course.
to narcotics agents, who then went out to the field to train other agents.

Federal penitentiaries held more narcotics violators than any other class of offender, including more than 1,500 prisoners known to be addicted. Since addiction maintenance was felt to be intolerable on ethical grounds, it was up to the U.S. Public Health Service, Representative Porter argued, to provide adequate hospital care. The Narcotic Farm Act was passed on Jan. 19, 1929, eventually providing for treatment facilities in Lexington, KY and Fort Worth, TX. This was the year of the stock market crash, ushering in the long grey years of the Great Depression. Prohibition enforcement was then in such disrepute that Porter was determined to establish once and for all an independent narcotics agency. Long a prophet of drug enforcement through international control, he also wanted to do away with the Federal Narcotic Control Board and vest its authority in a narcotics commissioner who by training and stature could lead U.S. control efforts overseas. When Levi Nutt was transferred from the Narcotic Division, amid accusations of family misconduct, the person appointed to take his place as Assistant Commissioner of Prohibition was Harry J. Anslinger. Mr. Anslinger had served as chief of the Treasury Department’s Division of Foreign Control, responsible for coordinating intelligence relate to alcohol and narcotics with the Department of State.

Representative Porter died only three days before the federal narcotics community—175 special agents and 271 narcotics agents—finally found their promised land. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was established on July 1, 1930. President Herbert Hoover, on September 25, appointed Harry J. Anslinger Commissioner of Narcotics, a position he would hold under four U.S. presidents for more than three decades. Henceforward, Commissioner Anslinger announced in an order to his field forces, the federal narcotics effort would be concentrated on the sources of supply. The law that created the FBN authorized the Commissioner to enforce the Harrison Act and to administer the regulatory requirements of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act in place of the now defunct Federal Narcotics Control Board. It also gave him authority to assign certain FBN officers at ports of entry. The main enforcement problem in his view was outside the U.S., and in the years to come he would spend much of his time overseas. Meanwhile, in the absence of any adequate international instruments of control, he reached personal agreements with the heads of twenty counterpart agencies in foreign countries to exchange intelligence. As a result of the new international effort, seizures took a quantum leap from 3,440 ounces of morphine in 1929 to 26,492 ounces in 1930. Among the most memorable seizures were 51 pounds of heroin and 104.5 pounds of morphine aboard the *Ile de France*, in cooperation with British and French authorities, and 214 pounds of
morphine shipped in cans from Antwerp to Hoboken aboard the steamship "Innoko." Another case resulted in the indictment of George and Elias Eliopoulos, later known as the Drug Barons of Europe, following the seizure of 17,500 cans marked "Furs," each containing one ounce of morphine, shipped from Istanbul to Brooklyn aboard the "Alesia." For the present the brothers were beyond the reach of the law. Elias, in Athens, felt so secure that he confided to a federal narcotics agent that he had recently made a trip to China and set up business with an associate in Tientsin. He predicted an annual turnover of tons of illicit narcotics to the United States.

If the FBN was going to commit its resources to the apprehension of major international and interstate traffickers, it was equally important, the Commissioner believed, to be relieved of the burden of what was termed in the annual report for 1931 "the ordinary localized police work of enforcement. His chosen vehicle for enlisting national support, while extending narcotics control to areas that could not otherwise be reached by the taxing power of the Harrison Act, was the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Conference had been holding hearings for five years when it met in 1932, at the Commissioner's suggestion, with representations from the medical profession and pharmaceutical industries. The proposed Uniform State Narcotic Law, substantially as approved by the Conference, eventually would be enacted by almost every state in the Union.

The Great Depression brought with it a deep sense of peril. From the American Southwest came reports of unrest and racial tension attributed by the press to the increasing presence of marihuana, which was suddenly recognized as a "Killer Drug" in the words of a widely distributed poster. The publicity, the Bureau noted in its annual report, "tends to magnify the extent of the problem and lends color to the inference that there is an alarming spread of the improper use of the drug, whereas the actual increase in such use may not be inordinately large." Commissioner Anslinger was reluctant to let anything deter him from his objective of controlling the traffic in opiates. Raw opium of Turkish origin was entering the country, primarily from French and Italian ports, secondarily from Mexico. Morphine was arriving from Japan as well as from French and German ports. And heroin was replacing morphine as the primary drug of addiction everywhere on the West Coast. Mr. Anslinger proposed to relegate marihuana control to an optional provision in the Uniform State Narcotic Law. In 1933, however, the annual report noted: "A disturbing development in quite a number of states is found in the apparently increasing use of marihuana by the younger element in the larger cities." Marihuana cigarettes then cost from 15 to 25 cents apiece or three for 50 cents.

“For every agent in our field service,” the 1935 report pointed out, “there are 10 convicted narcotic violators in the Federal penitentiaries.” The offenders
included a handful of physicians who went out of their way to challenge the Bureau’s authority to impose limits on their profession. Dr. Thomas P. Ratigan Jr. purchased from pharmaceutical companies 178,000 morphine tablets, which according to the Bureau’s reckoning was four and a half times the amount obtained by all the other physicians and hospitals combined in his home town of Seattle. He was tried and found not guilty by a jury. He was arrested in 1936 on charges of assaulting a narcotics agent, and once again found not guilty. Before the year was out he went on trial once more for violation of the federal narcotics laws, and this time he was fined $10,000 and sentenced to seven years in prison. Meanwhile, FBN agents had taken the precaution of circulating his name among drug manufacturers and wholesale dealers, requesting that they refrain from filling out his orders without first notifying the Bureau. Dr. Ratigan retaliated by filing a bill of complaint in the DC District Court, asking for a restraining order against the Commissioner of Narcotics. His petition was denied and he went to prison. It was, the annual report noticed, “the
most obstinate case of its kind in the annals of the Bureau of Narcotics.”

By this time the marihuana situation was described by the Bureau as “fraught with danger.” All 48 states then had legislation to control the cultivation of cannabis, but the production and use of marijuana was still not prohibited by federal law. The fear persisted that any federal drug law might be ruled unconstitutional. The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was therefore modeled on the Harrison Narcotics Act, as well as on a more recent act restricting gangsters from using machine-guns by requiring them to pay a transfer tax. This was the year of the famous Kartzenberg-Lvovsky case. It had come to light two years earlier when one Pietro Quinto, a chemist, had accidentally blown up a heroin conversion lab in New York City. Thereafter an organization, headed by Jacob Lvovsky, Jasha Katzenberg and Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, had completed six round-the-world trips to Shanghai, smuggling 649 kilos of pure heroin into the country at a profit of about half a million dollars. After FBN agents purchased a kilo of heroin from a member of the gang, indictments were returned, charging 32 persons with conspiracy. In sentencing Jacob Lvovsky to seven years in prison and a fine of $15,000, Judge William Bondy of the Southern District of New York declared: “I would rather be the victim of a murderer than a man selling narcotics. If he was an addict, I might have some sympathy for him. But where people prey on the weakness of a man—where they sell narcotics to these unfortunate addicts—I think there is no adequate punishment.”

On the basis of a study by the Public Health Service of narcotic drug addiction, the Bureau stated in its annual report for 1938: “It can definitely be concluded that drug addiction is one of the later phases of the criminal career of the addict rather than a predisposing factor. The progression of events is from criminality to addiction.” By now the Bureau had under way its first marihuana research project, cultivating its own cannabis plants on a protected plot along the banks of the Potomac River. “In the fight against narcotics,” Commissioner Anslinger warned publicly, “each victory leads to a new field of battle. Our most recent enemy is marihuana, the use of which as a narcotic was virtually unknown in the U.S. a decade ago. Out on the battlefront we must ask the actual help of every person. It is a new peril, in some ways the worst we have met, and it concerns us all.” In an article entitled “Regions of Sorrow,” written at the request of the Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, he called marihuana “one of the most dangerous and depraving narcotics known.” Reflecting the conventional wisdom of the day, he said, “The consumption of one marihuana cigarette is sufficient to push the psycho-neurotic type of person from sanity to madness.”

Louise “Lepky” Buchalter, a fugitive in the Katzenberg-Lvovsky case, tiring of intense pursuit, surrendered to federal authorities in 1939. He was convicted of conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws and sentenced to 12 years in prison. A codefendant in the case was found shot to death in upstate New York. FBN agents made an undercover purchase of heroin from an associate of Lepky, opening up an investigation of Lepke’s partner, Emanuel “Mendy” Weiss. As more bodies were found, Lepke’s own organization, captained by Weiss, became widely known in the press as “Muder, Inc.” Meanwhile the Bureau’s farsighted Commissioner was making arrangements with drug manufacturers to stockpile a sufficient quantity of opium for the medical needs of the coming war.

The international narcotics traffic had by then been suppressed to the point that heroin on the streets in 1940 was only about five percent pure, and many addicts were reported to be in search of paregoric. The shortage resulted in a rise of thefts from pharmacies, wholesale houses, and other sources of legitimate drugs. For the first time barbiturates became recognizable as a potential drug abuse problem. As WW II spread across Europe, it effectively closed the Mediterranean Sea to the narcotics traffic. The brothers Eliopoulos, homeless drug barons of Europe, sought sanctuary in France, Germany, the Balkans, Greece and North Africa, until they had no other recourse than to enter the U.S., where in 1941 they were promptly arrested by FBN and Customs agents. “The number one narcotics smuggling combination of all time,” as the FBI called them, would be tried, convicted and ultimately deported. A month before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, “Mendy” Weiss and one Louis Capone were convicted of first-degree murder in the state court of Kings County, New York.

The Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942 banned the production of the opium poppy except under license issued by the Commissioner. He also received emergency powers to control the flow of licit drugs in the interest of national defense. The Bureau announced in its annual report that Mexico had become the principal source of supply of smuggled drugs.

In anticipation of an end of the war, Representative Walter H. Judd introduced a resolution urging all poppy-growing nations to
agree to reduce the production of opium to the level of medical and scientific needs. World production of opium was estimated to be 2,647 tons, whereas no more than 440 tons were considered necessary for legitimate purposes. The Judd Resolution was passed by the Congress in 1944. That year an FBN investigation of Charles “Lucky” Luciano led to the arrest and conviction of half a hundred members of the 107th Street Mob, who had been bringing in opium from Mexico, converting it to heroin in New York City, and distributing it on both the East and West Coast. And Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, now Public Enemy Number One, died in the electric chair at Sing Sing.

WW II was over, but as Commissioner Anslinger said of the fight against narcotics, each victory leads to a new field of battle, President Harry S. Truman appointed Mr. Anslinger permanent U.S. representative on the Commission of Narcotic Drugs, established under the Economic and Social Council of the newly formed United Nations. The Commission held its first session in 1946 at Lake Success, New York. Commissioner Anslinger met privately that year with representatives of France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, whose governments soon announced they were giving up their Far Eastern opium monopolies. He also called on the Cuban ambassador and advised him of his intention to embargo all narcotic drugs to Cuba unless Lucky Luciano was deported. The President of Cuba signed the expulsion order the following day.

The paramount drug problem of the post-war world was the surplus production of opium, but that was not the only problem. Demerol, a synthetic substitute for morphine, had appeared on world markets in response to the needs of the war. Dilaudid had been produced in limited quantities for the past 15 years, and now
there were others with unfamiliar names like Amidone, Dolophine, and Methadone. Each new drug that came along required separate legislation before it could be controlled until the Bureau in 1946 received blanket jurisdiction over so-called synthetic drugs if demonstrably addictive. Cocaine, virtually non-existent for the past 15 years, began showing up in quantity at U.S. ports of entry in 1946 and was traced to 17 clandestine factories operating in Peru.

The Commissioner sponsored in 1948 a U.N. protocol to bring synthetic drugs under the same international controls as morphine and other narcotics. The protocol was signed by nearly all nations, including the U.S.S.R. One year later, the U.N. Commission on Narcotics Drugs, in its fourth session, expressed alarm at a rising tide of illicit traffic throughout the world. It reached tentative agreement to unify and strengthen eight existing international instruments of narcotics control into a single convention, including, if possible, a provision for limiting the production of raw materials. Meanwhile, the FBN detected a sinister rise in addiction throughout major metropolitan areas. There was another disturbing trend. The median age of male drug offenders received in federal prisons had fallen from 35.5 in 1945 to 31.7 in 1949. To integrate the domestic effort, the 1949 Hoover Commission made a recommendation whose time had not yet come. It proposed a transfer of the Bureau of Narcotics to the Department of Justice, pointing out that drug enforcement entails the same set of relationships with state and local agencies as that of other federal law enforcement agencies.

The FBN’s annual budget in 1950 was still slightly below $2 million, while the revenue accruing from all the applications of the law, including Customs duties, IRS collections, as well as enforcement fines and forfeitures, was valued at slightly above $2 million. Although the budget itself was about the same as at the Bureau’s inception 20 years before, its agent force had dwindled by this time to about one-fourth of the prewar period. Until now Mr. Anslinger had always resisted the temptation to ask for money or men, his instinct being to run a tight ship as close to the wind as possible. For the first time he acknowledged that there should be a substantial increase in the authorized strength of the Bureau, seeing stormy weather ahead. He also asked for tighter laws.

“Do you know that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics has a field force that does not exceed the strength of the police departments of Cambridge, MA; Sacramento, CA and Hoboken, NJ?” Representative Gordon Canfield asked the 82nd Congress. “There is not one police department in any fair-sized community in the country that has not been calling on the Federal Bureau for help, some of these calls being most urgent, because of the interstate or other federal angles involved. And consistently this small band of men in the Bureau is accounting for 10 percent of the persons now serving time in federal penitentiaries.” While FBN appropriations had remained at about the same level, he pointed out, those for the FBI had jumped to $90 million for the next fiscal year.
Irving Wexler, better known as Wexie Gordon, the top man in the beer business along the East Coast before the repeal of Prohibition, was one of a number of well-known hoodlums who drifted into the narcotics traffic. Prosecuted on an FBN case under New York State law as a fourth offender, he was sentenced in 1951 to a term of imprisonment from 25 years to life. Senator Estes Kefauver led a Senate investigation into organized crime, focusing public attention on the drug traffic. Representative Hale Boggs introduced a bill asking for mandatory minimum sentences, particularly aimed at second and third offenders. The Boggs Act of 1951 imposed two to five years for first offenders along with a fine up to $2,000, five to 10 years for a second offense, and 10 to 15 years for any subsequent offenses.

The Bureau did not subscribe to preventive programs that tried to turn young people from the path of drug abuse, pointing out in its annual report for 1952 that prohibitions in themselves may only serve to attract the young. But in response to a demand for literature on the subject, it published that year a pamphlet entitled “Living Death—The Truth about Drug Addiction,” reflecting the temper of the times. “Teen-age drug addiction,” it said, “in its inception and in its continuance is generally due to vice, vicious environment, and criminal associations, but it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the smoking of the marihuana cigarette is a dangerous first step on the road which usually leads to enslavement by heroin.”

The U.N. Opium Conference convened in 1953 to confront the task of curtailing surplus opium production, still about four times the medical requirements of the world. A protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium was signed by all of the nations attending before the end of the year. Henceforth stock inventories and estimates of licit opium needs were to be submitted to the Permanent Central Opium Board. Acknowledging the Commissioner’s leadership in this effort, the Hoover Commission Report of 1954 stated, “Fortunately for us, the head of this bureau has stood for 25 years as the greatest single bulwark against the spread of drug addiction throughout the world.”

Senator Joseph McCarthy led televised hearings into the alleged infiltration of the U.S. Army by Communists in 1954, while the Bureau began moving in on an enemy even closer to home, the Mafia. Among those charged with importing a dozen kilos of heroin a month into the U.S. and Canada was Joseph Valachi. Although his conviction on narcotics charges was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, he was soon to become the most famous of the Bureau’s informants—or “special employees” as the agents were instructed to call them in those days.

In the first half of the 1950s the average length of narcotics sentences in 86 U.S. district courts had doubled, from two years to four years, largely because of the penalty provisions of the Boggs Act. After the Congress unanimously passed the Boggs-Daniel Narcotic Control Act of 1956, the average length of sentences rose in the next two years from four to six years. The Act provided a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison for a first offense of illegally selling narcotic drugs or marihuana, and from 10 to 40 years for subsequent offenses with no possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The act further broadened the authority of both the FBN and Customs to execute search warrants at any time of the day or night. It also authorized the Bureau to provide professional training for state and local law enforcement officers.

The strong national reaction to the threat of the post-war drug traffic led to a counter-reaction in related professions of medicine and the law. The American Bar Association touched off a controversy when its Commission on Organized Crime announced its disapproval of minimum mandatory sentences. It formed a joint committee with the American Medical Association to look more
deeply into the drug problem in both its legal and medical dimensions. Meanwhile, in November 1957, public attention turned to the meeting of the Mafia at Appalachian in upstate New York, attended by a number of top traffickers, including Carmen Galante, “Big John” Ormento, Natale Evola and their host Vito Genovese. They were among 37 defendants indicated in July 1958 by a federal grand jury in New York City, following an FBN investigation of a conspiracy to smuggle heroin in 100-kilo lots from Europe, via Cuba, to the U.S. It was in that year that the interim report of the Joint ABA/AMA Committee came into the hands of Commission Anslinger. While acknowledging that strict law enforcement has its place in controlling narcotic drugs, the report questioned the impact of federal enforcement and urged the development of techniques to prevent addiction. Mr. Anslinger responded to the report with a note to the Committee, saying, “I find it incredible that so many glaring inaccuracies, manifest inconsistencies, apparent ambiguities, important omissions, and even false statements could be found in one report on the narcotic problem.”

In 1959 Vito Genovese, the alleged leader of organized crime, was sentenced to 15 years in prison and a $20,000 fine, and so was Joseph DiPalermo. Salvatore Santora, a defendant in the same narcotics case, was sentenced to 20 years, and 12 other Mafiosi received less severe sentences. Twenty who had attended the meeting at Appalachian were found guilty of conspiracy to obstruct justice. “The successful outcome of the Appalachian trial,” Attorney General William P. Rogers wrote to the Commissioner, “was due in no small measure to the diligent investigation and careful marshalling of the facts by the FBN. You certainly deserve congratulations for the major contribution you have made in this great team victory against syndicated crime.” In another case, following undercover negotiations with the FBN, Giuseppi Cotroni, whose headquarters were in Montreal, was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He received a sentence of 10 years in prison. Joseph Valachi, a fugitive at the time, was arrested by FBN agents, who then accidentally ran out of gas on their way to his incarceration. The obliging Valachi advanced them funds to complete the trip. He received a sentence of 15 years.

The number of federal narcotics agents stationed in Europe could then be counted on the fingers of one hand. The Bureau, however, was about to become a worldwide organization. In the summer of 1960 an FBN agent in Beirut obtained information that a man by the name of Tarditi was suspected of smuggling morphine base from Lebanon into France. When a second FBN agent in Paris learned from colleagues in the French Surete that Tarditi had recently returned to France from a trip to New York City, he was placed under surveillance. One of his friends turned out to be the Guatemalan ambassador to the Netherlands and Belgium, Mauricio Rosal. The Ambassador, traveling with diplomatic immunity, and Tarditi on a separate flight were followed to a rendezvous in New York City and arrested as Rosal was unpacking from his luggage 100 pounds of heroin. It was then the

FBN agents with a trunk that contained 10 kilos of heroin concealed in a false bottom. The trunk was seized from an art gallery that served as a mafia front for friends and family members of Lucky Luciano.

After the FBN received information connecting Rosal with a French trafficker named Etianna Tarditi in Paris, both men were followed, on separate routes, to a rendezvous in New York City. Together, FBN agents and the French police seized about 220 pounds of heroin. The investigation showed that Rosal, using diplomatic immunity with the help of Tarditi, was bringing into the country between 100 and 200 kilos of heroin a month. In 1964 the FBN also arrest diplomats from Mexico and Uruguay.
largest heroin seizure on record. The Bureau closed several of its branch offices in the U.S. and reassigned personnel to Europe, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

On March 30, 1961 the representatives of 74 nations signed the Single Convention, synthesizing more than half a century of thought and experience in the international control of narcotic drugs. That year Joseph Valachi, in the Atlantic Federal Penitentiary, received the ceremonial kiss of death from his cellmate, Vito Genovese. By now Valachi faced a second term of 20 years for violation of the federal narcotics law. After bludgeoning to death another inmate with an iron pipe, and having nothing else to lose, he was ready to tell the American public all it wanted to know and more about the Mafia.

In 1962 the Supreme Court struck down a California statute that made addiction a criminal offense, declaring it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Harry J. Anslinger, having reached the mandatory age of retirement, left the Bureau in the hands of his deputy, Henry L. Giordano, who issued a statement saying, “The Bureau of Narcotics subscribes completely to the view that the Federal Government does not consider drug addiction a crime.” President John F. Kennedy appointed Mr. Giordano Commissioner of Narcotics in August. One month later the President convened a White House Conference on Drug Abuse under the chairmanship of his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. “There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root,” the Attorney General stated, quoting Henry David Thoreau. “We have not been striking at the root.”

The following year, the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse was established, setting in motion the long, at times uncertain, but inevitable reorganization of federal drug abuse prevention and control. Meanwhile, public attention was turned to a window on the world of the Mafia. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Organized Crime and Narcotics, Joseph Valachi called it La Cosa Nostra in deference to J. Edgar Hoover, who said there was no such thing as the Mafia. In a rare tribute Valachi reported that the FBN had a reputation of being so perseverant that word had come down to the troops: “No narcotics.” Incidentally, in that year the term informant was introduced, in place of special employee, after one suffered a fatal accident and a court ruled that the widow was entitled to compensation for the rest of her life.

“The abuse of drugs has aroused two extreme attitudes—the punitive and the permissive,” observed the President’s Advisory Commission in the introduction to its final report, submitted Nov. 1, 1963. The Commission did not accept one to the exclusion of the other. The illegal traffic in drugs, it said, should be attacked with the full power of the Federal Government; the individual user should be rehabilitated, even if against his will. Calling the Bureau “an anomaly” in the Treasury Department since it had no revenue-collecting duties that were more than “a guise for law enforcement and regulation,” the Commission recommended that its enforcement functions be transferred to the Department of Justice. To regulate the licit distribution of narcotic and dangerous drugs and determine their safety, it recommended that a new unit be established within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. It also called for a substantial increase in the number of narcotic agents. At the time there were 297 enforcement personnel assigned to the Bureau. Fourteen of them by this time were
stationed in foreign countries—Italy, France, Turkey, Lebanon, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Mexico. “It is difficult to see,” the Commission concluded, “how the Bureau of Narcotics can adequately staff its offices in 41 American cities with only 283 agents.” Three weeks after the report was presented, the President was fatally shot in Dallas, TX by Lee Harvey Oswald.

In 1964 the Bureau’s small force of overseas agents was instrumental in the seizure of more than six million metric tons of opium or its equivalent in alkaloids—enough, it was estimated, to supply every known addict in the United States for at least half a year. There were big seizures at home, too. An FBN agent stationed in Marseille alerted the Bureau to a narcotics transaction in Columbus, GA where 95 kilos of heroin were seized in 1965. The investigation led to the arrest of a warrant officer and a major in the U.S. Army, two French nationals, and two Mafia members residing in Miami. All were convicted in federal court and received long prison terms. Another FBN agent, undercover and on foot in the mountains of Mexico, led the Mexican Federal Judicial Police to 3.5 tons of marihuana, the largest seizure then on record. The mid-1960s witnessed the crest of a wave of unrest. Cities overflowed into suburbs, and schools overflowed into the streets, where the flower children grew and the greening of America left a mold of drugs and crime. It was partly a matter of sheer numbers. As the post-war “baby boom” arrived, few knew what to make of its consequences. There was also a boom in the number of drugs. A Pandora’s Box of mixed blessings had been opened by the pharmaceutical industry: stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens and any number of pacifiers promising a chemical solution to life. Narcotic addiction was rumored to be endemic among U.S. troops in Vietnam, and at home drugs were exchanged by the young like potent watchwords of protest. “Alienation” became a vogue word to explain the yawning of the “generation gap.” While children eyed their parents with increasing distrust, the parents looked to their government, demanding an instant solution to “the drug problem.”

As of July 1, 1965, there were 3,998 drug law violators in federal institutions, comprising 17.9 percent of all persons confined, serving an average sentence of seven years four months. President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in response to the outbreak of lawlessness in the land. And Congress that year enacted amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, greatly extending federal controls over the manufacture, distribution and sale of the so-called dangerous drugs. The Food and Drug Administration had until now been obliged to use the complex misbranding provisions of the act to reach illegal distributors. Adopting the recommendation of President Kennedy’s Advisory Commission, the Food and Drug Amendments created within FDA a brand new federal enforcement unit, the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC).

BDAC, under the direction of John Finlator, came into existence on Feb. 1, 1966 with 100 agents, equipped with college degrees as well as arrest, search and firearms authority to carry out the new law. Congress passed the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA), giving young offenders without serious records the option of civil commitment, treatment, and rehabilitation in place of a prison term. The new law reflected deep fears of drug-related crime and high hopes for the alleged miracles of methadone maintenance. That year LSD broke into the news. BDAC agents in Los Angeles seized 3,000,000 dosage units of LSD, worth about a million and a half dollars.

In February 1967 the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration issued its general report, expressing the view that the Bureau’s force of 300 agents was insufficient and should be materially increased. The report was critical of civil commitment, and it recommended that discretionary powers should be restored to the courts to enable them to deal more flexibly with drug violators. A hundred thousand Hippies spent the long hot summer in the Haight-Asbury district of San Francisco. BDAC agents seized more than a million dosage units of hallu-
cinogenic drugs, most of it LSD. They also seized 50 pounds of pure methamphetamine in a New York City warehouse.

On Feb. 7, 1968, President Johnson sent a message to Congress, saying, “This administration and this congress have the will and the determination to stop the illicit traffic in drugs. But we need more than the will and the determination. We need a modern and efficient instrument to transform our plans into action.” The President’s proposal, known as Reorganization Plan No. 1, called for the abolishment of both the Bureau of Narcotics and BDAC and their reinstatement within the Department of Justice. Neither the House nor the Senate blocked the reorganization and it was implemented on April 7, 1968, bringing into existence the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). The name of the organization was not actually changed, it was simply lengthened to establish the new breadth of its jurisdiction. Henry Giordano and John Finlator, as associate directors, each brought with them a force of about 300 agents. Before the new bureau could be modern or efficient, there were rifts to close and wounds to heal. There were also entirely new fields of battle. Brown heroin of Mexican origin had already been reported. It was the year of the hallucinogenic explosion, producing an alphabet soup of strange acronyms, the significance of which could not yet be known: DET, DMT, DOM (also known as STEP), MDA and PCP. It was also an election year, and the pulse of the public beat faster to a call for law and order.

John E. Ingersoll, a former police chief of Charlotte, NC, was appointed Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on Aug. 1, 1968. Agent recruitment accelerated, giving a priority to officers of the Armed Forces as they emerged from military service. Mr. Ingersoll first was looking for loyalty—second for a new professionalism. Introducing the “systems concept,” the Bureau raised its sights to target on the loose, elusive narcotics conglomerates that dominated the drug world, while reorganizing field operations into a regional structure. It soon became apparent that professionalism, in the view of the Bureau’s soft-spoken but tenacious director, meant integrity, trust and teamwork. Within five weeks of taking office Mr. Ingersoll was on his way to Europe. French authorities for the moment were loath to acknowledge that there were any heroin laboratories left in Marseille, and the head of a new government in Turkey told him that no offer of U.S. aid to ban the poppy crop had yet been brought to his attention. Narcotic addiction was still recognized in Europe as “an American problem.”

On July 14, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon sent a special message to Congress, saying, “Within the last decade the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a local police problem into a serious threat to the personal health and safety of millions of Americans.” The number of addicts, he said, was now estimated
in the hundreds of thousands, and half of those now being arrested on drug charges were under 21 years of age. Citing drugs as a primary cause of an enormous increase in street crime, he called for a fundamental revision of both federal and state legislation to control “this rising sickness in our land.” Next day, the Attorney General forwarded proposed legislation that would make a clean sweep of all previously existing statutes.

After 15 months of deliberation, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act on Oct. 27, 1970. Replacing more than 50 pieces of drug legislation patched together in as many years, the new law strengthened support for treatment, rehabilitation and education as well as for regulation and enforcement. Title II, the enforcement provisions, otherwise cited as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), was built on entirely new constitutional grounds. Instead of the make-shift tax base, it now rested on the authority of the Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the scope of which had clearly broadened in the intervening years. The establishment of five schedules, classifying controlled substances according to their relative potential for abuse, permitted more sensitive quality control of the licit drug industry and international trade as well as the appropriate application of criminal penalties. Although mandatory minimum sentences were now set aside, the law provided for a number of “stronger and better tools” requested by the President, including denial and revocation of registration, administrative inspection warrants, civil punishment for regulatory violations, extraterritorial jurisdiction, broad subpoena powers and—most hotly debated of all—“no-knock” search warrants to break and enter under certain conditions. In response to the President’s call for “a more coordinated effort,” a companion piece of legislation, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, was made ready to synchronize state drug laws.

Meanwhile, a vacuum of knowledge, as the President called it, was “filled by rumors and rash judgments.” It was known that in New York City, the one metropolitan area where consistent statistics were kept on addiction, more people between the ages of 15 and 35 were dying from narcotics than from any other single cause. Fewer than 200 narcotic deaths had been recorded in 1960; more than a thousand were recorded in 1970. Until now the Bureau had been keeping a name file of known narcotic addicts, compiled by voluntary reports from state and local agencies. By mid-1970 the reported addict population stood at 68,864, according to the register the
publication of which was discontinued. Instead of keeping a name file, the Bureau tried to estimate the total number of addicts in the U.S., using statistical techniques similar to those already used by the Fish and Wildlife Service. According to the new “fish-in-a-pond” methodology, the following year there were 490,912 addicts in the country, most of them unknown. The abrupt shift in the spectrum did nothing to quell rumors and rash judgments at the height of the heroin epidemic, but it did conform, as closely as possible, to the Director’s insistence on fidelity to fact.

On June 17, 1971, the President sent a second special message to Congress, saying the drug problem had assumed the dimensions of a national emergency “afflicting both the body and soul of America.” Having taken steps to resolve the supply side of the equation under the Controlled Substance Act, he now addressed the problem of demand. Previous efforts, he said, had been fragmented by competing priorities, lack of communication, multiple authority, and limited resources. To mount a full-scale attack on drug abuse in America, he issued the same day an executive order, establishing within the Executive Office a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) to oversee all facets of treatment, rehabilitation, education and research for the next three years. Dr. Robert L. DuPont, SAODAP’s director, said the strategy was to make health care for addicts “so available that no one could say he committed a crime because he couldn’t get treatment.”

Beyond the horizon, there was immense progress. In 1971 the Convention on Psychotropic Substances provided the first international commitment to control stimulant, depressant and hallucinogenic substances. The UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was founded to create crop substitution and rehabilitation programs in cooperation with countries at the sources of supply. Mexico with U.S. aid deployed 10,000 troops to carry out an unprecedented poppy eradication campaign. Most important, France entered into formal agreements with the U.S. to sever the so-called “French Connection,” and Turkey pledged to prohibit poppy production entirely in the coming year. To coordinate the U.S. effort overseas, the President established the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC).

Since its inception BNDD had gone through a period of gigantic growth. The budget had jumped from $14.5 million (FY 1968) to $64.3 million (FY 1972). On Feb. 18, 1972, the Bureau had 1,361 special agents, 86 of them overseas. As compared with reports of the preceding year, the Bureau’s domestic arrests had roughly doubled (from 1,771 to 3,512), and foreign cooperative arrests had also doubled (from 188 to 394). Seizures of heroin or its equivalents had risen from 1,593 pounds to 3,784 pounds, while dangerous drug seizures in one year had jumped from 9 million to 207 million dosage units. The Bureau had by now established regulatory control over more than a half million registrants, licensed to distribute licit drugs. It had six of the most complete forensic laboratories in the world. Working more closely than ever before with state and local authorities, it was assisting in the creation of Metropolitan Enforcement Groups (MEGS). The first Joint Task Force was in operation in New York City. It was also participating in Organized Crime Strike Forces, created by the Department of Justice in 17 metropolitan areas. As the
quantity of achievements multiplied, the commitment was kept to improve quality. The Bureau’s new National Training Institute now set new standards of professionalism not only for its own agent force but for increasing numbers of law enforcement officers at home and abroad.

Although BNDD was steadily growing stronger, its ultimate objective of controlling the sources of supply was challenged by those who demanded the Government do more to attack crime in the streets. In January 1972 the President signed another executive order creating the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE). Commissioner of Customs Myles J. Ambrose was transferred to the Department of Justice as a Special Assistant Attorney General with the additional title of Special Consultant to the President for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. ODALE, under his direction, soon established nine regional offices of its own to thwart street pushers through special grand juries and to pool intelligence for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. But as each new agency entered the fray, there was further fragmentation by multiple authority, competing priorities, and lack of communication. In response to the need to coordinate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug intelligence, the President created another independent unit in the Justice Department under the direction of a former FBI chief, William C. Sullivan. The Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI), in the absence of any data base of its own, found itself left in the dark. The Strategy Council, established by the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, announced, “Availability is the one factor over which society can exert the most direct control.”

In the waning light of the Watergate Era, the President turned to Roy Ash, who had already been named director of the Office of Management and Budget for his second term of office. Mr. Ash set up a four-man task force to prepare options for the President in the reunification of federal drug law enforcement. The task force went to work in January 1973, and in less than a month presented three options to the President: (1) Put drug enforcement back in the Treasury Department where it had been until 1968; (2) put it in the FBI where the director, J. Edgar Hoover, had long been adamantly opposed to such a proposal; (3) put it, all together, in a new institution under the authority of the Justice Department. The President made the decision — there was no going back. On March 28, 1973, he submitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 2, saying, “This administration has declared an all-out global war on the drug menace.” He urged the consolidation of all anti-drug forces “under a single unified command.” Although the metaphors were military, there was at least a suggestion that the end was not victory but vigilance, and that the new organization was here to stay. It was named the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Federal drug law enforcement is founded on a record of achievement as old and honorable, as colorful and proud, as any in the annals of American criminal justice. The achievement is the effort. The rest is for history to decide. In retrospect, it thrived on difficulty, and there are more trials and tribulations ahead. BNDD, ODALE, ONNI and a large contingent from Customs would be unified to form an agent force 2,000 strong. Bearing the brunt of the reorganization would be John R. Bartles Jr., DEA’s first Administrator; and, in a time of troubles, Henry S. Dogin would be called upon to serve as Acting Administrator; until the unification was completed under the direction of Peter B. Bensinger. On July 1, 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration arose phoenix-like from the ashes. In the voice of one of our great allies in the darkest days of WW II: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”