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DEA Congressional Testimony
Statement by:
William Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources
Date:
August 6, 1999
Note: This document may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Chairman Mica and members of the Committee. It is a pleasure for me to appear here today to
testify on counterdrug issues in Colombia. We believe that the international drug trafficking
organizations based in Colombia who smuggle their poison into our country are, indeed, a threat
to the national security of the United States.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA holds itself to a high standard of evidence. Our
investigations aim to gather evidence sufficient to indict, arrest, and convict criminals. When
DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of
course within the strictures of the U.S. legal system, and in cooperation with our host nation
police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law, and must withstand
severe scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my testimony
will be limited to presenting DEA's view of the drug threat in Colombia today and a brief
statement of how we work to counter that threat.
I. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug syndicates which operate around the
world, supplying drugs to American communities, employing thousands of individuals to
transport and distribute drugs. The most significant international drug syndicates operating today
are far more powerful and violent than any organized criminal groups that we have experienced
in American law enforcement. Today's major international organized crime drug syndicates are
simply the 1990's versions of traditional organized crime mobsters U.S. law enforcement
officials have fought since the beginning of this century.
Members of international groups headquartered in Colombia and Mexico today have at their
disposal sophisticated technology -- encrypted phones, faxes, and other communications
equipment. Additionally, they have in their arsenal aircraft, radar-equipped aircraft, weapons
and an army of workers who oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in South
American jungles to the urban areas within the United States. All of this modern technology and
these vast resources enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations
which reach into the heartland of America, while they themselves try to remain beyond the reach
of American justice. The traffickers also have the financial resources necessary to corrupt
enough law enforcement, military, and political officials to create a relatively safe haven for
themselves in the countries in which they make their headquarters.
These international drug traffickers use sophisticated, high tech equipment and are proficient in
the use of cell phones, pagers, faxes and other conveniences. The cell structure of the
organizations necessitates a complex system of communications to enable the organization's
leaders to know where every kilo of cocaine is located, how much profit is being made, and
where and when deliveries will take place. By using cell phones and pagers, the leaders
communicate with different segments of the organization, and provide only pieces of information
to each segment, thereby reducing the vulnerability of individuals and the entire organization.
As complex as these communications arrangements of organized crime groups are, U.S. law
enforcement agencies have been able to exploit their communications by using court-approved
telephone interceptions. With the top leadership of these organizations in hiding beyond the
immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement, we have directed our resources at their organizational
structure, and their transportation and distribution elements in the United States.
We have been able to identify, indict, and in many cases arrest, international drug traffickers
because the very feature of their operations which makes them most formidable -- the ability to
exercise effective command and control over a far flung criminal enterprise -- is the feature that
law enforcement can use against them, turning their strength into a weakness. However, it must
be noted that the spread of non-recoverable encryption technology threatens to remove this
essential investigative tool from our arsenal, and poses, in our view, a threat to the national
security of the United States because it will hamper law enforcement efforts to protect our
citizens from drug trafficking organizations operating abroad.
II. EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN COLOMBIA
The international drug syndicates who control drug trafficking today from the source zone,
through the transit zones in the Caribbean and through Mexico, and into the United States, are
interconnected. We cannot discuss the trafficking situation today without looking at the evolution
of the groups from Colombia --- how they began, what their status is today, and how the groups
from Mexico have learned important lessons from them, thereby becoming major trafficking
organizations in their own right.
Throughout the 1980's and into the early 1990's, the Medellin Cartel dominated the international
cocaine trade. In the late 1980's, the Ochoa brothers (Juan David, Jorge Luis, and Fabio) ran the
most powerful of the Medellin Cartel drug trafficking organizations. Taking advantage of
Colombia's lenient sentencing provisions, the Ochoa brothers voluntarily surrendered to the
Colombian Government in late 1990 and early 1991. Following their surrender and the violent
deaths of Jose Rodriguez Gacha (December 1989) and Pablo Escobar (December 1993), the
Medellin Cartel fragmented and gradually lost its secure lock on the international cocaine market.
In the early 1990s, as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel surrendered
to avoid extradition, the loose association of five independent drug trafficking
groups collectively known
as the Cali Cartel dominated the international cocaine market. Where the
Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the criminals
who
ran their organization from Cali,
labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, by posing as businessmen carrying
out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders --- the Rodriguez Orejuela
brothers, Jose Santacruz
Londono, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera Buitrago--- amassed fortunes and ran their
multi-billion dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia.
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his
associates comprised what was, until then, the most powerful international
organized crime group in history. They employed a wide range of aircraft,
including Boeing 727s, to ferry drugs
to Mexico, from there the drugs were smuggled into the United States, and
then the money from U.S. drug sales was returned to Colombia with. Using
landing
areas in Mexico, they were able to
evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important alliances with transportation
and distribution experts in Mexico.
With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by the brave men and
women in the Colombian National Police during 1995 and 1996, all of the top leadership of the
Cali syndicate ended up either in jail, or dead. The capture of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in
1995, the death of Jose Santacruz Londono in March 1996, and the surrender of Helmer Herrera
in September 1996--have accelerated the decentralization of the drug trade. Since the Cali
leaders' imprisonments (on sentences that in no way matched the severity of their crimes)
traffickers from Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance between the Colombian
traffickers and the organizations from Mexico benefitted both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers
from Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine into the
United States, and had established solid distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the
Cali syndicate was concerned about the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal
with the traffickers from Mexico in order to reduce their potential losses.
This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the Andean region to the Mexican
organizations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine to the United States.
As the arrangement evolved, trafficking groups from Mexico now are routinely paid for their
services in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their
own right.
Drugs at The Source
The international drug syndicates discussed above control both the sources and the flow of drugs
into the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United States continues to
come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Virtually all of the estimated six
metric tons of heroin produced in Colombia in 1998 is destined for the U.S. market. For nearly
two decades, crime groups from Colombia have ruled the drug trade with an iron fist, increasing
their profit margin by controlling the entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control
ranged from the coca leaf production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, to the cocaine
hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale
distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.
Colombian traffickers continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of
Bolivia and Peru, but in ever decreasing amounts. Coca leaf production continues
to grow within Colombia itself. The
traffickers move the cocaine to the large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories
in southern Colombia. The vast majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl
destined for the United States
is produced in these laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of these activities
take place in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia.
Most of the coca cultivation in
Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo. This
cultivation occurs in areas that are effectively under control of insurgent
groups. Cocaine conversion
laboratories range from smaller "family" operations to much larger facilities,
employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is
either shipped via maritime vessels or
aircraft to traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor,
including the Bahamas Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico,
Miami, and New York.
Drugs in Transit
Over half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through
Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of this cocaine enters the United States in
privately-owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There is new evidence that indicates a few
traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to
circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the supply of cocaine entering the U.S.,
trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking thousands of
pounds of methamphetamine.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by Colombian organized
criminal groups. The Caribbean had long been a favorite smuggling route used by the Cali and
Medellin crime groups to smuggle cocaine to the United States. During the late l970's and the
l980's, drug lords from Medellin and Cali, Colombia established a labyrinth of smuggling routes
throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian
Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques to transfer their cocaine to
U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian
Island chain and off the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000
kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port of Miami.
After Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates in the Cali crime syndicate were brought
to justice by Colombian authorities in 1995, new groups from the North Valle del Cauca began
vying for control of the lucrative markets on the United States East Coast, previously dominated
by Rodriguez Orejuela. Experienced traffickers who have been active for years--but worked in
the shadow of the Cali drug lords-- have more recently proven adept at seizing opportunities to
increase their role in the drug trade. Many of these organizations began to re-activate traditional
trafficking routes in the Caribbean to move their product to market.
DEA's focus on the Cali organization's command and control functions in the U.S. enabled us to
build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which allowed our Colombian counterparts to
accomplish the almost unimaginable-- the arrest and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of
the most powerful crime group in history. Although Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his
confederates continue to direct a portion of their operations from prison they are no longer able to
maintain control over this once monolithic giant. Now, independent groups of traffickers from
the Northern Valle del Cauca have replaced the highly structured, centrally controlled business
operations of the Cali group. These new groups tend to be smaller and less monolithic; however,
they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control their trafficking empires.
III. ORGANIZED CRIME SYSTEMS BASED IN COLOMBIA
Despite the rise to power by the Mexican crime syndicates and their increasing control of the
wholesale cocaine trade in the United States, Colombian traffickers still control the manufacture
of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every
kilogram of cocaine sold in U.S. cities and towns.
DEA has identified major organizations based on the northern coast of Colombia that have
deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the
United States each year. Colombian managers, who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic, operate these command and control centers and are responsible for
overseeing drug trafficking in the region. These groups are also directing networks of
transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of
cocaine destined for the continental United States.
Colombian trafficking organizations have potentially produced an estimated 165 metric tons of
cocaine HCl, some six metric tons of heroin, and over 4,000 metric tons of marijuana in 1998.
The bulk of these illicit drugs is destined for the United States. Colombian traffickers continue
to control the supply of cocaine at its source and dominate the wholesale cocaine market in the
eastern U.S. and Europe.
As indicated above, traffickers from Colombia supply almost all of the cocaine to the Mexican
crime syndicates. The Mexican organizations purchase cocaine, as well as accepting cocaine in
payment for services, from Colombian groups. This change in the manner in which business is
conducted is also driven by the new trafficking groups in Colombia, who have chosen to return to
the Caribbean to move their cocaine to the United States.
Mexican organized crime syndicates now control the distribution of cocaine in the western half
and the Midwest of the United States. Moreover, the Colombians have franchised to criminals
from the Dominican Republic a substantial portion of the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin
trade on the East Coast of the U.S. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control of the
sources of supply. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly entrenched as low-level
cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger Northeastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume
a far more significant role in this multi-billion-dollar business.
The Dominicans in the U.S., and not the Colombians, are the ones subject to arrest, while the top
level Colombians control the organization with increasingly encrypted telephone calls. This
change in operations reduces profits somewhat for the syndicate leaders. It succeeds, however,
also in reducing their exposure to U.S. law enforcement. When arrested, the Dominicans will
have little damaging information that can be used against their Colombian masters. Reducing
their exposure, together with encrypted communications, puts the Colombian bosses closer to
their goal of operating from a political, legal, and electronic sanctuary.
IV. COLOMBIAN CRIME GROUPS IN THE U.S.
Colombian cocaine trafficking groups in the U.S. -- consisting of mid-level
traffickers answering to the bosses in Colombia -- continue to be organized
around "cells" that operate within a given
geographic area. Some cells specialize in a particular facet of the drug
trade, such as cocaine transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money
laundering.
Each cell, which may be
comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little or no knowledge about
the membership in, or drug operations of, other cells.
The head of each cell reports to a regional director who is responsible for the overall
management of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports directly to one of the drug
lords of a particular organization or their designee based in Colombia. A rigid top-down
command and control structure is characteristic of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the
organization in the U.S. have discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests
with the leadership in Colombia.
Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are normally comprised of family members
or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the Colombian drug lords -- because their
family members remain in Colombia as hostages to the cell members' good behavior -- to handle
their day-to-day drug operations in the United States. The trusted personal nature of these
organizations makes it that much harder to penetrate the organizations with confidential sources.
That difficulty with penetration makes intercepting criminal telephone calls all the more vital.
They report back to Colombia via cell phone, fax and other sophisticated communications
methods. Colombian drug traffickers continually employ a variety of counter-surveillance
techniques and tactics, such as fake drug transactions, using telephones they suspect are
monitored, limited-time use of cloned cell phones (frequently a week or less), limited use of
pagers (from 2 to 4 weeks), and use of calling cards. The top level managers of these Colombian
organizations increasingly use sophisticated communications and encryption technology, posing
a severe challenge to law enforcement's ability to conduct effective investigations.
V. TERRORIST INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE
There is deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the Administration and in the Congress, about the
connection between the FARC and other terrorist groups in Colombia and the Drug Trade. This
summer's events in Colombia demonstrate the danger posed to the Colombian people by the
terrorists. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding to this armed challenge.
DEA will continue to pay close attention to FARC involvement in the drug trade. We will,
together with our Colombian partners, take whatever steps are necessary to attack the
international organized crime groups that are the driving force behind the drug trade and the
armed groups that may be protecting them.
DEA has in the past demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight drug trafficking. For
example, we participated in the struggle with Pablo Escobar in Colombia, a trafficker who
turned to terrorism when the net was closing around him. DEA worked openly with the
Colombian Police to hunt him down. We will work alongside our long-term colleagues in the
CNP to indict and bring to justice any drug trafficker, FARC or otherwise, as long as the charges
can be proven in court. DEA carries out its operations in partnership with the CNP.
An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s,
drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist
guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the
drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to
provide security services.
General reporting indicates that many elements of the FARC and the ELN raise funds through
extortion, or by directly selling security services to traffickers. Their actions are by no means
limited to dealing with the traffickers. The terrorists extort from all manner of economic activity
in the areas in which they operate. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for
weapons, the terrorists protect cocaine laboratories, drug crops, clandestine airstrips, or other
interests of the drug traffickers.
The terrorists are not
the glue that holds the drug trade together. It is, however, certainly true
that
the "cash cow" represented by the drug trade has taken on a big, and probably
growing role in financing the terrorists. If the traffickers did not buy security
from the FARC or ELN, they
would buy it from elsewhere -- as they have done in the past.
The frequent ground fire sustained by CNP aircraft when engaged in eradication missions over
FARC or ELN controlled areas is indicative of the extent to which the terrorists will go to protect
the drug interests. Some of these shootings may well have been angry peasants lashing out at a
government target. In either case, these shooting incidents pose a threat to personnel conducting
counter-lab or eradication operations.
VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The Colombian National Police is a major law enforcement organization with a long and honored
tradition of integrity. The CNP had some corruption problems in the 1980s and early 1990s, but
took the needed steps to address that corruption and have moved on to aggressively attack the
drug menace. Under the direct command of General Rosso Jose Serrano, the CNP has become
recognized for its dedication, patriotism and commitment to integrity. The CNP has introduced
fundamental changes in the force in order to make it a thoroughly modern and efficient
institution within the context of Colombia and the international community.
General Serrano has been an advocate on behalf of the thousands of loyal and dedicated
Colombian National Police officers within the ranks. He has encouraged their motivation, even
in the face of the tragic losses of over 900 fellow police officers in the last three years alone. The
fact that the CNP, and other members of Colombia's law enforcement community, were able and
willing to pursue operations against the drug underworld is a testament to their professionalism
and dedication.
All of the top Cali drug lords either have been captured by the CNP, have died, were killed, or
have surrendered to Colombian authorities. These unprecedented drug law enforcement
successes were the culmination of years of investigative efforts by the CNP, with active support
from DEA. Unfortunately, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates, who comprised the
most powerful international organized crime group in history initially received shamefully short
sentences for their crimes. In January 1997, Gilberto was sentenced to 10 and 1/2 years in prison
on drug trafficking charges. As a result of Colombia's lenient sentencing laws, however, Gilberto
may serve only five years. Miguel, originally sentenced to nine years, was later sentenced to 21
years on Colombian charges based on evidence supplied by the United States Government in the
Tampa, Florida, evidence-sharing case. Miguel is expected to serve less than 13 years in prison.
The Colombian judicial system must be strengthened to that the traffickers, once convicted, are
sentenced to terms commensutate with their crimes.
The CNP continues to pursue significant drug investigations in cooperation with the DEA. The
CNP is also aggressively pursuing significant counterdrug operations against cocaine processing
laboratories, transportation networks, and trafficker command and control elements. We expect
these operations will result in prosecutions in both Colombia and the United States.
VII. CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders
of the new criminal groups from Colombia. These criminals have already moved to make our
task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower
profile than their predecessors. A number of initiatives hold particular promise for success:
- The U.S. Embassy's Information Analysis/Operations Center (IAOC) will be increasingly
utilized to coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the activities of drug
trafficking groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of the Andes Mountains.
The IAOC is comprised of Embassy personnel from the DEA Bogota Country Office and U.S.
Military's Tactical Analysis Team. Support and staffing also are provided by the Defense
Attache Office and the State Department. This organization should be the central
clearinghouse for counterdrug law enforcement cooperation in Colombia.
- The special unit program, funded under the Andean Initiative, will make it possible to convert
existing partially vetted units of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of
investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high level drug investigations.
- There are several cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations currently underway, which benefit
from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. In the very near future
these investigations should lead to the dismantling of major portions of the most significant
drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant
drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work with our partners in
Colombia to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling. The ultimate
test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires
of crime which bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried
and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their
crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face American justice.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
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