Chairman Mica and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity
to appear today at this hearing on "International Law: The Importance of Extradition".
I would first like to thank the Subcommittee for your continued support of
the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and your overall support of drug law enforcement. My testimony will
provide you with an objective assessment of the law enforcement issues involving
international organized criminal
groups and describe the role that the DEA plays in identifying and combating
these groups. The DEA recognizes that our success will continue to be limited
until the leaders of these criminal
organizations are brought to justice either in their native country or through
the extradition process. We also recognize that extradition is vitally important
in the short term, as an effective
tool that can be utilized to achieve success in our overall drug control
strategy.
While the mechanics of the extradition process are not in the purview of the DEA's area of
responsibility, we have seen time and again, that the international drug traffickers that we are
charged with investigating, fear extradition to the U.S. For that reason extradition has, many
times, been a powerful tool in our counter-drug strategy. The traffickers fear extradition to the
United States because they cannot obtain acquittal through violence, intimidation or bribery, buy
preferential treatment in our criminal justice system, nor can they easily escape from U.S.
prisons. DEA's primary mission is to target the command and control structure of the highest
levels of the international drug trafficking organizations operating today. The DEA's
investigative objectives, as well as our joint investigations with our state and local counterparts,
are a very important part of our global strategy to combat international drug trafficking
organizations. By using a global strategy, we also gather vital intelligence which assists our
interdiction counterparts, and are able to build sound cases against the leadership of these
organizations, which may enable us to indict and extradite those individuals who reside outside
of the United States.
International Organized Crime
It is important to demonstrate at the outset why the threat posed by international drug syndicates
is so ominous. The United States must be able to attack the command and control functions of
the international syndicates which are directing the flow of drugs into this country. Focusing the
attention of law enforcement on the criminals who direct these organizations is the key to
combating international drug trafficking. Accordingly, the DEA directs its resources against the
leaders of these criminal organizations, seeking to have them located, arrested, extradited,
prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with the heinous nature of their crimes.
The complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating out of Colombia
and Mexico, are vicious, destructive entities which operate on a global scale. Trafficking
organizations from Cali, and the four largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico ---
operating out of Guadalajara, Juarez, Mexicali, Tijuana, Sonora, and the Gulf region --- are
simply organized crime groups. The organizational leaders --- the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers in
Colombia and Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes, Jesus Amezcua, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and Ramon
and Benjamin Arellano-Felix from Mexico---are simply the 1990's versions of the mob leaders
U.S. law enforcement has fought since shortly after the turn of this century. These international
organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a greater impact on
our day-to-day lives than did their domestic predecessors. The drugs and the attendant violence
which accompanies the drug trade, has reached virtually every community in the United States.
These international trafficking groups make operational decisions from places like Cali,
Colombia, Sonora, Mexico and other locations outside the U.S. borders, which dilute American
quality of life and directly impact drug-related crime in places such as Orlando, Florida, Yakima,
Washington, and Charlotte, North Carolina. It has become evident that these groups have reached
new levels of sophistication and have become a threat not only to the United States and Europe,
but their own nations, and other Latin American nations as well. Their power and influence is
being witnessed on an unprecedented scale, and unless innovative, flexible, multi-faceted
responses are crafted, these drug trafficking organizations threaten to grow even more powerful
in the years ahead.
International criminal organizations who currently control the drug trade from its source, through
the Caribbean and Mexico, and on into the United States are to a large degree, intertwined. We
cannot discuss the trafficking situation today without looking at the evolution of the groups from
Colombia, and how the groups from Mexico have learned from them, which has created the
situation we are facing today.
Colombian Trafficking Organizations
During the late 1980's and early 1990's the major traffickers from Medellin,
Colombia, were investigated, arrested and prosecuted by the Colombian National
Police (CNP) and the DEA.
This began with the important return of Carlos Lehder to face drug charges
in the United States, and ended with the death of Pablo Escobar at the hands
of the CNP. As the Medellin traffickers
disintegrated, the Cali traffickers quietly coalesced and assumed power equal
to that of their predecessors. The drug traffickers from Cali were far more
sophisticated than the Medellin
group and eventually became deeply involved in all aspects of the cocaine
trade, including production, transportation, wholesale distribution and money
laundering.
Whereas the Medellin
traffickers seemed to revel in the terror and violence that became their
trademark--and ultimately contributed to their downfall--the Cali traffickers
attempted to
avoid indiscriminate violence,
further contributing to their image as legitimate businessmen. However,
when the Cali traffickers employed violence to attain their goals--and they
frequently
did--it was precise and
exacting. The Cali leaders --- the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers, Jose Santacruz
Londono, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago--- amassed fortunes and ran their
multi-billion dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia.
Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela and his
associates composed what was, until then, the most powerful international
organized crime group in history. They employed commercial aircraft to ship
metric ton
quantities of cocaine into
Mexico. Using landing strips in Mexico, they were able to evade U.S. law
enforcement and made important transportation alliances with the traffickers
in Mexico.
Once the cocaine was
safely delivered to traffickers in Mexico, independent Mexico-based transportation
groups subcontracted by the Colombian trafficking organizations arranged
for the delivery of the cocaine
to contacts within the U.S.
With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by the brave men and
women in the CNP during 1995 and 1996, all of the top trafficking leaders from Cali are either in
jail or dead. During this same time frame, U.S. law enforcement agencies were effectively
attacking Colombian cells operating within the United States. With the Cali leaders'
imprisonment in Colombia and the attacks on their U.S. cells, traffickers from Mexico took on
greater prominence. This alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the organizations from
Mexico benefited both sides. Traffickers from Mexico had long been involved in smuggling
marijuana, heroin, and cocaine across the U.S.-Mexico border using solid distribution routes to
deliver drugs throughout the United States. The Mexico-based organizations' emergence as
major methamphetamine producers and traffickers all contributed to making them a major force
in international drug trafficking. The Mexican traffickers, who were previously paid financially
by the Colombian traffickers for their services, would now routinely receive up to one-half of the
shipment of cocaine as payment. This led to Mexican traffickers having access to multi-ton
quantities of cocaine allowing them to expand their markets and influence in the United States,
and making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right.
Traffickers from Mexico Rise to Prominence
Recent events highlight the ever-changing nature of drug law enforcement efforts against
international drug traffickers. The Mexican-Central American corridor has been the primary
smuggling corridor for cocaine destined for the United States since the 1980's. Events in Mexico
and along the border bring emphasis to the fact that trafficking groups from Mexico are a
significant force in international organized crime. These organizations are no longer simply
middlemen in the cocaine transportation business. With the disruption of the Cali syndicate,
groups such as the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the Amezcua-Contreras brothers, and the Caro-Quintero group have consolidated their power and now
dominate drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border and in many U.S. cities. These
organizations reach into the very elements of the Mexican government which are intended to
fight drugs, as the traffickers continue a reign of terror and violence along the border with the
United States.
The violence that is an essential part of these ruthless and powerful organizations impacts
innocent citizens who live in the United States. The traffickers' willingness to murder and
intimidate witnesses and public officials has allowed these organizations to develop into the
present day threat they are to the citizens of the United States and Mexico. Drug traffickers
continue their brazen attacks against both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials and their
sources of information. These traffickers have long had the ability to corrupt and intimidate
public officials and institutions throughout the world.
The battle against corruption in Mexico is a long-term endeavor that requires constant vigilance.
The ability of any government to attack powerful criminal organizations is dependent upon the
existence of honest, dedicated law enforcement professionals. To attain this goal, meaningful
anti-corruption initiatives which lead to sound criminal investigations and prosecutions of
corrupt officials must be aggressively pursued. Only when implementation of these measures
results in widespread behavioral changes can success be realized by an honest cadre of law
enforcement officials against these organizations. Part of this process must be grounded in
bringing the individuals responsible for facilitating large-scale drug trafficking to justice. Only
through ensuring that these international traffickers face monetary sanctions as well as serve
prison sentences commensurate with their crimes, can we expect significant success.
In many cases, particularly in Colombia, we have seen that the traffickers that are arrested and
jailed continue to wield influence from their prison cells. They continue to have access to their
wealth that allows them to buy preferential treatment, the ability to communicate with surrogate
employees, and gives them the ability to continue to intimidate, corrupt and threaten the very
institutions responsible for their incarceration. This became blatantly evident in Colombia when
Pablo Escobar surrendered to Colombian authorities and was incarcerated in Envigado prison.
As part of Escobar's surrender agreement, security would be the Army's and Escobar's
handpicked bodyguards responsibility. The prison was quickly transformed into a veritable
mansion, with lavish penthouse and furnishings. While incarcerated he continued to run his drug
trafficking enterprise. His downfall began when he ordered the murder of two of his top
lieutenants who had been summoned to Envigado by Escobar. Pending a transfer to a more
secure facility, Escobar escaped and became the target of the largest manhunt in Colombia's
history. If sentences and prison accommodations in these countries are not meaningful, then
extradition to the U.S. must be a tool in our arsenal to ensure that traffickers account for their
crimes in the country whose laws they violated, prosecution takes place in a jurisdiction where
the evidence and witnesses are located and we can be sensitive to the victims adversely affected
by their criminal conduct.
Drugs at The Source
The international drug syndicates discussed above maintain control over both the sources and the
flow of drugs into the United States. The cocaine entering the United States continues to come
from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. According to DEA's Heroin Signature
Program, which provides a chemical analysis of domestic heroin seizures and purchases to
determine the geographic sources of origin, South American heroin comprised 75 percent of all
heroin seized in the United States in 1997 and heroin from Mexico now represents 14% of the
heroin seized in the United States. In addition, a current study being conducted by DEA
indicates that as much as 29% of the heroin being used in the U.S. is being smuggled in by the
Mexico-based organized crime groups.
For nearly two decades, crime groups from Colombia have ruled the drug trade by utilizing a
tight organizational structure. The traffickers from Colombia, from Medellin then Cali,
depended upon the acquisition of tons of raw coca from Bolivia and Peru. This coca was then
converted to cocaine hydrochloride (HCl), generally in Colombia. These groups then used
ingenious methods to deliver tons of cocaine to the U.S. and Europe, refining trafficking routes
and techniques as necessary. Their vast responsibilities and their intricate distribution networks
in the United States necessitated that they rely on a sophisticated system which ensured
maximum security with minimum risk.
Colombian traffickers continue to dominate the movement of cocaine from the jungles of Bolivia
and Peru to the large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories in Southern Colombia. An estimated
thirty-five percent of the world's coca leaf is grown in Colombia and the vast majority of the
cocaine base and cocaine HCl is produced in these laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of
these activities take place in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of
the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo.
Also, cultivation occurs in areas of high insurgency that are effectively beyond the control of the
Colombian Government.
As reported in The Miami Herald on May 6, 1999, the CNP raided May
5, 1999, what are being touted as the "most sophisticated cocaine-processing complexes in Colombia's history".
This laboratory complex was spread over seven square miles and was capable
of producing massive
quantities of cocaine. Cocaine conversion laboratories
range from smaller "family" operations to
much larger facilities, employing dozens of workers. It is estimated that
this compound had sleeping quarters that could accommodate approximately
200 workers. Three hundred officers
raided the laboratory site, which culminated in the seizure of precursor
chemicals, cocaine HCl, processing equipment and documentary evidence. In
this type of
laboratory environment, once
the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime or aircraft
to traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including
the Bahamas Island Chain, to U.S.
entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New York, or shipped directly to
the United States.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean (Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic and the Bahamas) is
overwhelmingly influenced by Colombian organized criminal groups. Over the years, the
Caribbean has been a favorite smuggling route used by the Medellin and Cali crime groups to
smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the United States. During the late l970's and the l980's,
Colombia-based traffickers established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the central
Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas Island chain to South
Florida, using a variety of techniques to transfer cocaine to U.S. markets. Past smuggling
scenarios included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the coast
of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000 kilograms, and the commercial
shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port of Miami.
DEA has identified four major organizations based on the northern coast of Colombia that have
deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the
United States each year. Colombian cell managers, who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico
and the Dominican Republic, operate these cells and are responsible for overseeing drug
trafficking in the region. These groups are also directing networks of transporters that oversee
the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the
Continental United States.
The Law Enforcement Response
America's long experience with countering organized criminal activity has necessitated the
development and execution of an aggressive strategy to identify, target, arrest and incapacitate
the leadership of these organizations. DEA's role in addressing the drug problem is to continue
to attack the leadership of these international criminal organizations. With a strategy consisting
of mounting strategic strikes on the organizational command and control, the DEA is able to
degrade the ability of the organizations to conduct business and impede their efforts to import
drugs into the United States. Each time we demolish an organization as part of this strategy, we
further facilitate the intelligence collection process which is critical to the interdiction of drugs.
DEA gains vital intelligence about an organization to use both to further additional investigative
efforts and in increasing the accuracy of intelligence information provided to interdiction
operations conducted by other agencies. The domestic and international aspects of trafficking
organizations are inextricably woven together. Therefore, DEA believes that the United States
must be able to attack the command and control functions of the international syndicates on all
fronts which are directing the flow of drugs into this country.
Despite our many efforts to often repeatedly indict the leadership of these organizations, the
current situation on many occasions, is that these drug lords are not apprehended by our
international host country counterparts. Even if they are arrested, they are seldom, if ever,
extradited back to the United States to face justice and serve sufficient prison sentences. The
obstacles facing law enforcement in Mexico and Colombia are enormous. The traffickers are
used to operating in an environment free from the fear of extradition, where drug traffickers
intimidate, bribe, corrupt, and violently retaliate against the law enforcement and judicial
systems. In order for the DEA and our international counterparts to be successful in our efforts,
aggressive law enforcement principles, extradition treaties and the restructuring of judicial and
governmental institutions must be applied or we will continue to be limited in success.
Our international cooperative efforts have proven to be successful in other parts of the world.
For example, in 1994, the DEA and the Royal Thai Police initiated Operation Tiger Trap,
designed to disrupt the heroin trafficking capabilities of the Shan United Army (SUA), the
principal producer of Southeast Asian heroin. As a result of Operation Tiger Trap and other
influences, the SUA warlord Chang Chi-fu, aka Khun Sa, surrendered to the Burmese authorities
and remains under house arrest. The initial phase of Operation Tiger Trap resulted in the arrest
and extradition of thirteen heroin traffickers, to include Kao Chang Pin, a top level heroin broker
in the SUA. This coordinated law enforcement effort severely hampered heroin production in
Shan-controlled areas.
The Role of Extradition: Colombia
From a historical standpoint, Colombia has experienced decades of narco-terrorism,
some of which escalated over constitutional amendments allowing for the extradition
of Colombian
nationals to the United States. Earlier in my testimony I described a number
of acts of terrorism carried out by the Medellin trafficking organizations,
which were used to intimidate rival
traffickers, government officials, and informants. During this time frame,
a degree of this violence was also used as a tool to thwart extradition requests
by the United States Government.
During the rise of the Medellin traffickers in the 1980's, the violence reached
unprecedented levels as the CNP became increasingly more aggressive in their
counter-drug efforts, and high
level traffickers were in danger of facing extradition. One of the most
prominent Medellin traffickers at that time, returned to the United States
in 1987, was
Carlos Lehder. He was later
convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
To illustrate the vehemence in which Colombia traffickers resisted and feared
extradition, Carlos Lehder was
instrumental in forming a political debate over the merits of extradition
and publicly faced off against Colombia's Justice Minister, Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla.
In 1984, when Bonilla was suddenly
murdered, traffickers from Medellin, hidden behind the pseudonym "The Extraditables" were
suspected.
In response to fear and the threat of extradition, the traffickers from Medellin continued to utilize
violence and intimidation to rule their criminal enterprises. This violence was also used as a
threat to the government to guard against extradition. Armed security forces were employed to
enact terrorist activities and assassinations against rival traffickers, organizational employees,
hundreds of Colombian police officials, judges, journalists, and innocent bystanders. These
attacks included the murder of a Justice Minister and a Presidential candidate. The Medellin
traffickers bombed an Avianca Jetliner in 1989, which killed 110 people, and also bombed the
Department of Administrative Security headquarters in December 1989, killing an additional 50
and wounding another 200 individuals. As evidenced by these examples of extreme violence,
calculated intimidation, and terrorism, it is easy to understand that our host country government's
judicial systems would be ineffective in countering these attacks.
This wave of violence contributed to the abolishment of extradition in Colombia in 1991, and
soon after, the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar surrendered to the Colombian Government to
take advantage of lenient prison sentences. Escobar continued to run his organization from
prison until his escape in 1993, and his death shortly thereafter, following a shootout with the
CNP.
More recently, the traffickers from Cali reacted violently upon the arrests of their leadership in
1995. Cali assassins killed more than a dozen suspected government informants and during 1992
in Queens, NY, journalist Manuel de Dios Unanue, who was an outspoken critic of the Cali
traffickers, was murdered. Jose Santacruz Londono was later implicated during a criminal
proceeding in NY, as having ordered de Dios' murder.
In spite of the abolition of extradition from Colombia in 1991, the United States Government has
continued to work with the Government of Colombia on reinstating the extradition amendment.
As a result, Colombia passed a constitutional amendment on December 17, 1997, which would
allow for the extradition of Colombian nationals. President Andres Pastrana released
Colombia's Drug Control Strategy in October 1998 and made a specific reference to using
extradition as a tool against international drug trafficking. Since that time, the United States
Government has requested the provisional arrest and extradition of four Colombian nationals,
one of which is Diomedes Sevillano, who remains at large. Our requests for extradition of these
individuals are based on two significant investigations conducted in cooperation with Colombian
law enforcement authorities. Four pending extradition matters are currently under review by the
Colombian Supreme Courts.
Although the Colombian Government has been supportive of our desires to extradite Colombian
nationals, their constitutional amendment referred to earlier, has yet to be tested under its new
parameters. These guidelines require overt acts, charges, and indictments dated after the
December 17, 1997, effective date of the amendment. The DEA will continue to work with the
Colombian Government, the United States Department of Justice, and the State Department to
coordinate the provisional arrest and extradition of Colombian traffickers who must be brought
to justice.
The Role of Extradition: Mexico
In light of some of the issues discussed earlier in my testimony regarding the rise to prominence
of the trafficking organizations based in Mexico, one of the biggest threats to our success against
these traffickers is their continued willingness to corrupt and intimidate through bribery and
violence. It is our belief, that the expulsion and extradition of the major traffickers in Mexico,
many of whom have been repeatedly indicted in the U.S., would be a strong benchmark in
measuring Mexico's success in counter-drug efforts. More importantly for the Government of
Mexico (GOM), would be the extradition of incredibly violent traffickers such as Ramon
Arellano-Felix and top organizational members that could well assist in breaking the strangle-hold of violence and intimidation that exists in that country. This would serve to benefit the
dedicated professionals within the GOM, and in particular in the PGR, and give them the
opportunity to combat major drug trafficking organizations, similar to what was experienced in
Colombia following major trafficker extraditions in the 1980's.
The GOM has made some progress regarding extradition over the last several months. In
November 1998, Bernardo Velardes-Lopez, a Mexican national, was extradited to the U.S. to
face murder and drug trafficking charges stemming from his involvement in the murder of U.S.
Border Patrol Agent Alexander Kirpnick in June 1998. Although this is a positive step, this
extradition cannot be defined as that of a significant trafficker, or even a mid-level trafficker. On
March 23, 1999, the GOM extradited Tirzo Angel Robles to the United States to face marijuana
trafficking charges. He was charged and convicted in the U.S. but escaped from a U.S. prison in
1995 and fled to Mexico. He was arrested in Mexico and deemed extraditable in February 1997.
However, although Robles is the first Mexican national to be extradited to the U.S. for drug
offenses, he will only serve time for the drug offenses for which he was convicted upon his initial
arrest. Under GOM law, the U.S. will be prevented from prosecuting him further for his escape.
These cases illustrate that the extradition of Mexican nationals can be accomplished. The next
step in the process should be the extradition of top echelon drug traffickers. This would be a
significant step forward for all of the reasons I have already illustrated.
The United States has presented the GOM with extradition requests on a significant number of
Mexican traffickers. Extradition requests which have been made to the GOM by the U.S. for
major traffickers who have been indicted in DEA investigations include: